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Computer Technology Exports Under the
Export Administration Amendments Act
of 1985: Taking Competitive Advantage
of China's Open Door
By SYLVIA R. GILL
Member of the Class of 1988
International competitiveness is a growing concern for the computer
industry and for the United States Government. When the People's Re-
public of China (China) recently opened its doors to foreign trade, repre-
sentatives of industry and government perceived the opportunities
offered by a new foreign market. China's interest in computer technol-
ogy acquisitions may allow the United States to improve its stance in the
world marketplace.
Bilateral interest alone, however, will not spur trade. A favorable
trade environment must exist between China and the United States.
China has officially adopted a trade policy that encourages imports of
computer technology, but United States exporters encounter barriers that
limit their ability to meet Chinese demands for their products.
Extensive controls on exports reflect United States trade policy.
The Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended by the Export Ad-
ministration Amendments Act of 1985 (Amendments),' gives the Com-
merce Department authority to impose a system of export controls.' The
Commerce Department's Office of Export Administration (OEA), which
1. Export Administration Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-64, §§ 101-301, 99
Stat. 120, 120-62 (1985) (amending and extending Export Administration Act of 1979, §§ 1-
24, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2421 (1982)) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 2401-2420 (Supp. III 1985)).
2. Until 1949 the U.S. Government imposed export controls during wartime only. The
Export Control Act of 1949 was enacted to control the export of advanced technology to the
Soviet Union. Export Control Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-11, 63 Stat. 7 (codified as amended
at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2021-2032 (1964) (expired 1969)). The Export Administration Act of
1969 revised and amended the 1949 legislation. Export Administration Act of 1969, Pub. L.
No. 91-184, 83 Stat. 841, (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2413 (1976) (expired
1979)). The Export Administration Act of 1979 revised and amended the Export Administra-
tion Act of 1969. Export Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503 (codi-
fied as amended at 50 U.S.C. app., §§ 2401-2420 (1982) (expired 1983)).
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administers the system, has broad jurisdiction over the exportation of
goods and commercial technical data.3 It has power to regulate re-ex-
ports of United States-origin goods and technology4 and, in certain cases,
it has jurisdiction over exportation of foreign products made with United
States technical data or American-manufactured components.5 The reg-
ulations adopted by the OEA (Regulations) implement the system of ex-
port controls through a combination of licensing procedures and specific
export restrictions.6
Export controls are an especially important consideration for
United States companies that manufacture or sell computer technology.
Exports of computer technology to China are subject to licensing re-
quirements for trade policy reasons.7 Furthermore, United States com-
puter producers are in a vulnerable world market position and, thus, are
economically sensitive to export controls imposed by Congress.8 Com-
puter companies are economically vulnerable because of rapid technolog-
ical advances. To win market share and to preserve profit margins,
producers of computer technology face time pressures to place high qual-
ity, technologically advanced products on the market before their com-
petitors do.
Export administration is one crucial area in which the law can be
aligned with trade policy and economic necessity. Proponents of the
Amendments believed that legislation could enhance America's competi-
tiveness in international markets. By adopting the Amendments, Con-
gress required the Commerce Department to take steps to improve the
efficiency of export regulation and to minimize interference with the abil-
ity to engage in commerce.9 The Chinese market for exported computer
technology provides an opportunity to test the Government's ability to
respond effectively to economic and policy demands and thus to improve
the United States' competitive stance.
This Note will discuss the impact of United States trade controls on
exports of computer technology to China. Section I presents the legisla-
tive history of the Amendments. In addition, the perceptions of and
3. Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404 (1979) (amended 1985).
For a definition of commercial technical data, see infra note 111.
4. 15 C.F.R. § 374.1 (1987).
5. Id. § 379.5.
6. Id. §§ 368-399. See infra text accompanying notes 78-99.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 81-83.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 18-27.
9. See Export Administration Amendments Act of 1985, 50 U.S.C. §§ 2401-2420 (Supp.
III 1985). See also Harris & Bialos, Congressional Balancing Act Benefits Exporters, Legal
Times, August 5, 1985, at 17, col. 1.
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motivations behind export controls will be evaluated by describing both
Chinese import policies and United States export policies. Section II dis-
cusses the current treatment of computer technology exports to China
under the Regulations. Section III describes congressional and industry
responses to amended United States export policy. Section IV argues
that the current Regulations perpetuate the problems inherent in the ex-
port control system. Finally, Section V recommends a broad, sweeping
reform of the system as it applies to computer technology exports that
are controlled for national security reasons.
I. PROLOGUE TO RELAXED TREATMENT OF
COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY EXPORTS
A. Legislative History of the Export Administration Amendments
Act of 1985
Congressional consideration of the Amendments began when the
Export Administration Act of 1979 (1979 Act) 10 expired on September
30, 1983.11 Attempts to renew the 1979 Act spanned two Congresses
and involved numerous delays. The Senate approved the conference re-
port12 on the pending measure on June 27, 1985.13 The House of Repre-
sentatives approved the Amendments the same day.1 4 Two weeks later,
the President signed the Amendments into law. 5 The legislation
amended and reauthorized the 1979 Act, the main trading law regulating
the export of United States goods, technology, and data.16
Industrial competitiveness is measured by such factors as productiv-
ity, real wages, and the trade balance. The trade balance "shows the net
figure for the value of all the goods imported and exported by one na-
tion." 1 7 At the time Congress was considering the Amendments, the
competitive position of the American computer industry in the world
market was declining.1 8 While other nations traditionally had looked to
10. Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420 (1982).
11. Id. § 2419.
12. S. 883, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
13. 131 CONG. REC. S8921 (daily ed. June 27, 1985).
14. Id. at H5059.
15. Export Administration Amendments Act of 1985, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2420
(Supp. III 1985).
16. Although the Amendments amend the 1979 Act to a degree, they essentially extend
the 1979 Act through September 30, 1989. Id. See generally Recent Developments, 27 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 259 (1986).
17. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 130 (5th ed. 1979).
18. Woods, The U.S. Computer Trade Surplus Erodes, Bus. AM., Sept. 30, 1985, at 8. See
generally OFFICE OF COMPUTERS & BUS. EQUIP., A COMPETITIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S.
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the United States for manufactured goods-particularly high technol-
ogy-foreign producers were increasingly supplying the United States.
The overall trade balance was marked by a merchandise trade deficit,
19
that is, the volume of imports exceeded the volume of exports.20 As the
overall trade balance declined, the traditionally strong trade surplus2 in
computer technology also began to dwindle.22 According to Commerce
Department figures, the trade surplus for computer equipment and re-
lated parts peaked at $6.8 billion in 1981.23 Thereafter, as the rate of
imports exceeded that of exports, the trade surplus steadily declined to
about $5.9 billion in 1984.24 This trend is expected to continue: the
trade surplus may become a trade deficit.25
A major factor in the decline in computer technology market
strength has been the substantial importation of computer peripherals,
especially disk storage devices (disk drives), printers, display terminals,
and related parts and subassemblies.26 The imports issue from foreign
suppliers and overseas subsidiaries of American firms. 27 These sources
represent the first serious foreign competition in the history of the United
States computer industry.
It appears that the United States' ability to compete in the world
market is eroding. Although the computer sector is a growth industry,28
DISK STORAGE INDUSTRY (1985) [hereinafter DISK STORAGE ASSESSMENT]; OFFICE OF COM-
PUTERS & Bus. EQUIP., A COMPETITIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. SOFTWARE INDUSTRY
(1984) [hereinafter SOFTWARE ASSESSMENT].
19. The merchandise trade deficit-the difference between the volume of merchandise im-
ported and exported-peaked at a record $152.7 billion in 1986, 16% larger than in 1985.
1986 Deficit Hits Record $153 Billion Even Though December Figures Show Improvement, 4
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 125, 125 (Feb. 4, 1986).
20. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 17, at 130.
21. A merchandise trade surplus occurs when the volume of exports exceeds imports.
22. Woods, supra note 18, at 8.
23. SOFTWARE ASSESSMENT, supra note 18, at v. The surplus resulted from $8.5 billion
in exports and $1.6 billion in imports.
24. Id. That figure represented $13.5 billion in exports and $7.6 billion in imports.
25. Computer equipment and scientific/analytical instruments remain the only two U.S.
electronics-based industries with trade surpluses. Woods, supra note 18, at 8. The software
industry is the only high technology industry that maintains its international leadership undi-
minished by foreign competition. SOFTWARE ASSESSMENT, supra note 18, at iv.
26. DISK STORAGE ASSESSMENT, supra note 18, at v.
27. Id. Regardless of whether the company is American-owned or foreign, the purchase
abroad has an adverse affect on the U.S. as a place of production and on the balance of trade.
See U.S. High Technology Trade Surplus May Slide Into Deficit, Joint Economic Committee
Warns, 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1286, 1286 (Oct. 22, 1986) [hereinafter ITR/Deficit
Warning].
28. The U.S. computer industry (including its overseas operations) holds an estimated
70% share of the computer market. The value of U.S.-based production has risen 20% annu-
ally since 1979. Woods, supra note 18, at 8.
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growth in the American computer industry's productivity lags far behind
that of foreign competitors. In the Pacific Rim and elsewhere, vital new
industries challenge the United States' most successful emerging industry
by offering high-quality products at attractive prices. Both developed
and developing foreign nations have targeted the United States computer
29Usntechnology industry through their industrial policy programs. Using
tariffs, nontariff market barriers, and other aggressive trade policies, for-
eign competitors successfully restrain American export growth.30
Although their ultimate effect is difficult to determine, such policies have
resulted in lost sales for American companies. 31 The Japanese, the
United States' principal competitors in the computer field, have demon-
strated a growing strength in exports of computer peripherals such as
printers, disk drives, and terminals, and have gained a competitive posi-
tion in the personal and supercomputer markets. In a preliminary report
released August 11, 1986, Japan's Finance Ministry stated that Japanese
computer exports had risen 51.6 percent since July 1985.32 Taiwan33 and
Korea34 are also increasingly visible in the world computer marketplace.
Loss of position in vital high-growth computer technology markets
has immense implications for America's future competitiveness. 35 The
President's Commission on Industrial Competitiveness found the declin-
ing United States share of the world high-technology market particularly
troubling for several reasons. First, because of the rapidly increasing de-
mand for these products, they represent a major growth opportunity.36
Second, high technology's value is far greater than the trade dollars it
29. See generally Hatter, East Asian Countries Play Key Role in Eroding U.S. High-Tech
Trade Surplus, Bus. AM., Sept. 2, 1985, at 6-9.
30. Woods, supra note 18, at 9-11.
31. As the rate of imports increased, the corresponding rate of exports decreased. From
1979-1984, imports grew at a 51% compound annual rate, while exports increased at a 20%
pace. Woods, supra note 18, at 8.
32. July Trade Surplus Hits Record $8.22 Billion as $4.52 Billion US. Imbalance Also
Nears High, 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1042, 1042 (Aug. 13, 1986). From 1979-1984 Japanese
computer exports to the U.S. increased almost sixteenfold. Woods, supra note 18, at 9.
33. In 1984 the U.S. had a $403 million computer trade deficit with Taiwan. Woods,
supra note 18, at 9. See also Stokes, Rising Trade Deficit, High-Tech Growth Are Threats to
US.-Taiwan Relations, 17 NAT'L J. 2696 (1985).
34. The U.S. had a computer trade deficit with South Korea of $24 million in 1984.
Woods, supra note 18, at 9.
35. Competitiveness is defined as "the degree to which a nation can, under free and fair
market conditions, produce goods and services that meet the test of international markets
while simultaneously maintaining or expanding the real incomes of its citizens." 1 PREsi-
DENT'S COMM'N ON INDUSTRIAL COMPETITIVENESS, GLOBAL COMPETITION: THE NEW
REALITY 6 (1985).
36. Id. at 16.
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represents.37 Innovation increases productivity and allows American
firms to earn more than their foreign counterparts. In addition, techno-
logically superior products command premium prices in world markets.
Finally, because technology changes quickly, with each advance building
on those that precede it, a decline in competitiveness in one round makes
it much more difficult to enter the competition at a later date.38
In its consideration of the Amendments, Congress sought a solution
to the American computer industry's need to increase exports. Export
controls represented a major market barrier: United States export con-
trols were strongly criticized for being less efficient than those regulating
foreign competitors. The criticism was well-founded: foreign govern-
ments provide more precise licensing guidelines, 39 answer questions
promptly," and usually issue licenses quickly.41 Efficiency is critical to
the computer industry, where service and the availability of spare parts
after the sale are central factors in product choice.42 A study by the
National Academy of Sciences confirmed the economic cost of export
controls. The study, which focused on the effects of national security
export controls on high technology, found that "a reasonable estimate of
direct short-run economic costs to the U.S. economy in 1985 was in the
order of $9.3 billion."43 That figure translates to a loss of 188,000 Amer-
ican jobs, all resulting from United States controls on exports.44 The
overall drain on the nation's economic vitality, including the multiplier
effect of that spending on other business, totalled $17.1 billion.45
The time was ripe for policy changes vis-A-vis China. Because of
technological evolution and China's rapid development, the liberalization
in 1983 of controls on high-technology exports to China had become in-
adequate. At the time they were promulgated the 1983 relaxation of con-
trols affected about seventy-five percent of license applications to
China.46 After just two years, however, China needed so many new
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Schatz, A Modem Moving Story, DATAMATION, July 15, 1984, at 64, 69.
40. Id.
41. 131 CONG. REC. H5062 (daily ed. June 27, 1985) (statement of Rep. Mica). E.g., U.S.
exporters' Japanese counterparts can be licensed in a month or less. Id.
42. Dam, Economic and Political Aspects of Extraterritoriality, 19 INT'L LAW. 887, 890
n.17 (1985).
43. Wash. Post, Jan. 12, 1987, at A16, col. 3 (quoting draft report of National Academy
of Sciences study).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Technology Transfer, Financing Problems Hamper Trade Expansion, NFTC Session
Told, 2 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1374, 1374 (Oct. 10, 1985) [hereinafter ITR/Tech Transfer].
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high-technology imports that the decontrol list covered less than half the
applications.47
The Amendments reflect the current status of the Chinese-American
trade relationship.48 Congress had two motives in enacting the legisla-
tion. The first was to enable American firms to fill the need for techno-
logical aid in China's drive for industrial modernization, giving the
United States "a chance to change relations in the geopolitical sense, not
just in the trade sense."4 9 The second motive was to enact legislation
that would ease controls and produce a procompetitive impact on com-
puter exports. 0
Private industry's reaction to the legislation has been cautiously op-
timistic. Although Congress faced no opposition from the computer in-
dustry, industry representatives have called for more radical decontrol. 1
Despite the recent changes, the industry argues that the United States
continues to encumber exporters of high-technology goods with extensive
restrictions. 2
Although both the House and the Senate agreed on the need to re-
store America's industrial competitiveness, they had differences of opin-
ion about the role of the Department of Defense (DOD) in the
enforcement of controls. In general, the Senate wanted the DOD to re-
view all applications for technology licenses for goods being exported
abroad, while the House did not.53 After a "long and hard-fought strug-
gle," 54  Congress finally compromised on the issue of DOD
involvement. 5
47. Id.
48. See infra text accompanying notes 56-77 for Chinese policy on computer technology
imports.
49. Baldridge Sees US. Opportunity to Change China-India-U.S.S.R. Ties through Trade,
2 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 752, 752 (June 5, 1985) [hereinafter ITR/China Ties].
50. Note, The 1983 Amendment to the Export Administration Regulations: The Status of
Export Controls to the People's Republic of China, 6 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1096, 1104 n.64
(1984-85).
51. Ericson, Export Decontrol: Some LightAhead?, J. Com. & Com., Aug. 5, 1986, at 2A,
cols. 5-6; N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1987, at A41, col. 2.
52. Bieber Asserts U.S. Should Establish National Trade Policy to Halt Growing Deficits, 2
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1495, 1496 (Nov. 27, 1985) [hereinafter ITR/Nat'l Trade Pol'y]; N.Y.
Times, supra note 51, at A41, col. 3.
53. See 131 CONG. REC., supra note 41, at H5061 (statement of Rep. Zschau).
54. Id. at S8921 (statement of Sen. Heinz).
55. Id. at H5061 (statement of Rep. Zschau). See text accompanying notes 94-99 for a
discussion of DOD involvement.
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B. China's Open Door Policy Towards Computer Imports
In 1978 the Chinese Government under Deng Xiaoping adopted a
new economic policy, often referred to as the "open door policy."56 This
policy transformed China's development strategy from self-sufficiency to
active participation in the world market. By opening its doors to foreign
trade, China created a new prospect for American suppliers of computer-
related products. 7 The Seventh Five-Year Plan, released on April 12,
1986, extends the open door policy's market-oriented reforms and decen-
tralization to 1990.58 China's past investment in the computer industry
under the Sixth Five-Year Plan is expected to double under the current
Plan.59
China's import activities reflect the priority given to computer tech-
nology. The number of import licenses for computer-related products
grew from 10,000 in 1983 to 110,000 in 1984.60 In 1984 alone, Chinese
parties imported some 40,000 to 50,000 personal computers, most of
them Apple- or IBM-compatible systems.61 Mini- and microcomputers
and large capacity disk drives are among Chinese priorities for technol-
ogy import.62
Despite a well-publicized reduction in foreign exchange spending
56. See generally Huan, China's Open Door Policy, 1978-1984, 39 J. INT'L AFFAIRs 1
(1985).
57. The Chinese have developed science and technology cooperation programs, educa-
tional exchanges, and commercial technology relations with all the major industrialized na-
tions, Eastern Europe, and the Third World. See Simon, The Evolving Role of Technology
Transfer in China's Modernization, in STAFF OF JOINT ECON. COMM., 99TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
CHINA'S ECONOMY LoOKs TOWARD THE YEAR 2000: ECONOMIC OPENNESS IN MODERNIZ-
ING CHINA 254-86 (Comm. Print 1986) [hereinafter COMMITTEE REPORT]. For a discussion
of China's plans for computerization, see Simon, China's Computer Strategy, CHINA Bus.
REV., Nov.-Dec. 1986, at 44.
58. Stuermer, Can China Make Its New Five Year Plan Work?, E. ASIAN EXECUTIVE
REP., Apr. 15, 1986, at 9-10.
59. Simon, supra note 57, at 44.
60. Meilach, Peking Reverses Open-Door Policy on Computer Imports, PC WEEK, Sept. 17,
1985, at 137, 144 (quoting EDP China Report, published by IDC Asia, a Hong Kong-based
market research firm). In 1984 high-technology licenses for nonsensitive products, particu-
larly computers and scientific instruments, reached $2 billion. The value of actual shipments
probably surpassed $300 million. MFN Tarriff Treatment for Romania, China and Hungary
Will Continue, 2 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1051, 1052 (Aug. 21, 1985).
61. Meilach, supra note 60, at 144. The number of computers in China has doubled in
recent years to about 100 million. ITR/China Ties, supra note 49, at 752.
62. Joining U.S. Technology, Chinese Capability Will Produce Globally Competitive Prod-
ucts, 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 874, 875 (July 2, 1986) [hereinafter ITR/US Tech, Chinese
Capability]. China has standardized on IBM and IBM-compatible equipment. The Chinese
prefer to buy compatibles from non-IBM suppliers. King, Eagle Eye on China, DATAMATION,
Feb. 1, 1985, at 55, 61.
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since 1985, computer technology purchases continue to increase. 63 Cur-
rent Chinese policy on computer technology is one of long-term commit-
ment. Computers are considered an essential element of China's
modernization plans.64 China offers a variety of investment incentives to
attract foreign capital, managerial expertise, and advanced technology.65
The Chinese Government is developing a more defined legal framework
for transactions involving imports of computer technology." Recently
introduced regulations relating to technology transfers have greatly re-
laxed legal constraints.
Commercial contracts in China can now be negotiated more quickly
and efficiently as a result of current Chinese policies. 67 The Regulations
for the Administration of Technology Import Contracts (Technology
Import Contract Regulations) 68 codify general policies on the import of
foreign technology that were previously articulated in public statements,
63. However, representatives of U.S. companies are cautious. Tightening hard currency
spending may mean a slowdown. Chang & Pow, Technology Transfer to China: Dealing with
the Rules, E. ASIAN EXECUTIVE REP., Jan. 15, 1986, at 8.
64. Foreign Exchange Shortage Seen Curtailing Plans to Acquire Mosf Western Technol-
ogy, 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 473, 473 (Apr. 9, 1986). China views technological moderniza-
tion as an essential step toward its long-term economic goals. China uses imports to
modernize the energy and transportation infrastructures, both of which restrain economic po-
tential. Id.
65. The Government substantially reduces import duties on technically "advanced"
items. Huan, supra note 56, at 5. Chinese-foreign joint venture projects receive several mone-
tary advantages. The tax rates on projects that import "advanced" technology are much lower
than the rates for other projects. Id. Also, a balance of foreign exchange is not necessarily
required. Id. The Provisional Regulations of the Reduction and Exemption of Income Tax on
Fees for the Use of Proprietary Technology, tran in E. ASIAN EXECUTIVE REP., Apr. 15,
1983, at 24, offer incentives to purchasers or foreign users in China. Because of the priority
status of computer technology, the Chinese Government has great flexibility in allowing relief
and may interpret the law in favor of American importers. ITR/U.S. Tech, Chinese Capabil-
ity, supra note 62, at 876.
66. The Chinese recognize the need to develop law, particularly commercial law, to facili-
tate business transactions in China. Horsley, National Technology Transfer Regs Codify Gen-
eral Policies on the Import of Technology, E. ASIAN EXECUTIVE REP., July 15, 1985, at 9.
67. See generally Lubman, Technology Transfer in China: Policies, Practice and Law, in
COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 57, at 287-308. See id. at 289-94 (treatment of technology
transfer contracts); id. at 294-96 (license agreements).
68. As promulgated May 24, 1985, the Technology Import Contract Regulations apply to
the following: (1) the transfer or license of patents and other industrial property rights; (2) the
provision of blueprints, technical materials, or norms representing proprietary technology or
know-how relating to production processes, formulas, product designs, quality control, and
management aspects; and (3) the rendering of technical services by foreign companies. Regu-
lation for the Administration of Technology Import Contracts (1985), trans. in E. ASIAN
EXECUTIVE REP., July 15, 1985, at 28. See generally Horsley, supra note 66; Recent Develop-
ments, 27 HARV. INT'L L.J. 275 (1986). The Technology Import Contract Regulations apply
to contracts for import by Chinese companies, enterprises, organizations, and individuals of
technology owned by foreign companies, enterprises, organizations, or individuals. Id. at 275.
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contract negotiations, or regulations with narrower applications.69 Other
regulations supplement the Technology Import Contract Regulations.7°
Parties to a technology transfer must sign a contract that complies with
the Foreign Economic Contract Law and with other relevant Chinese
laws.7 '
Recent changes in Chinese law resolve some of the previous uncer-
tainties about proprietary rights, a particular concern of the computer
technology industry. For instance, China's new Patent Law72 enables
Chinese and foreign corporations and individuals to register inventions,
designs, and utility models and thus obtain exclusive rights to their use in
China." Also, both the foreign investor and consumer now receive more
comprehensive protection under an improved Trademark Law.74 A re-
cently introduced copyright law significantly affects the protection of
rights in computer software. 75 Finally, while no trade secret law cur-
69. Horsley, supra note 66, at 9. The Technology Import Contract Regulations do not
offer much guidance on what terms will be acceptable in technology transfer contracts. They
require that proposed imported technology be "advanced" and "appropriate," without speci-
fying what will be deemed "advanced" or "appropriate" technology. Torbert, Technology
Transfer to China under the New Regulations, E. AsIAN EXECUTIVE REP., Sept. 15, 1985, at 8-
9; Horsley, supra note 66, at 10. The Technology Import Contract Regulations contain a list
of additional requirements, at least one of which must be met, and which suggest a third
general requirement-that the transfer offer a significant economic benefit. Id. at 10. Chinese
authorities resolve uncertainties on a case-by-case basis. Torbert, supra, at 8.
70. Several local provisions preceded the national regulations. The Interim Provisions of
the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SEZ) for the Import of Technology, promulgated by
Guangdong Provincial People's Congress in February 1984, specifically applied to the nontax
aspects of technology transfer. Horsley, supra note 66, at 9; see Leung, Recent Technology
Transfer Regulations: Some Comments, E. ASIAN EXECUTIVE REP., Mar. 15, 1985, at 9. The
Provisions of the Xiamen SEZ for the Import of Technology, promulgated by Fujian Province
in July 1984, and the Regulations Involving Foreign Economic Contracts for the Shenzhen
SEZ, promulgated in February 1984, govern technology transfers between foreign and Chinese
enterprises in their respective locales. Horsley, supra note 66, at 9.
71. [1 Bus. Reg.] China Laws for Foreign Business (CCH Austl. Ltd.) 5-550 (Sept. 21,
1987). A contract must describe the relevant technology (including associated patents and
trademarks), specify the technical objective to be achieved using the technology, and stipulate
the amount, form, and method of remuneration. Horsley, supra note 66, at 11. See generally
Gelatt & Kraiem, The Foreign Economic Contract Law: More Autonomy for Contracting Par-
ties, E. ASIAN EXECUTIVE REP., May 15, 1985, at 9.
72. Patent Law of the People's Republic of China (1984), [2 Bus. Reg.] China Laws for
Foreign Business (CCH Austl. Ltd.) 1 11-600 (Mar. 14, 1987). See Lubman, supra note 67, at
298-303.
73. Chang & Pow, supra note 63, at 14. Specialists recommend that American companies
use a contract approach in protecting any proprietary information and not rely solely on the
Patent Law for protection. ITR/U.S. Tech, Chinese Capability, supra note 62, at 876.
74. Trademark Law of the People's Republic of China (1982), [2 Bus. Reg.] China Laws
for Foreign Business (CCH Austl. Ltd.) 1 11-500 (Mar. 14, 1987). See generally Lubman,
supra note 67, at 303-05.
75. Epstein, The Law Leaps Ahead, FAR E. ECON. REV. (Apr. 17, 1986), at 52.
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rently exists, observers believe China will eventually adopt one.76
In addition, China's National People's Congress recently adopted
general provisions of civil law.77 The Chinese Government has been re-
sponsive to China's economic needs in enacting legislation which has fa-
cilitated trade with American high-technology companies. As the
Chinese interact with foreign investors and suppliers, they probably will
continue to develop law to comport with their changing needs.
C. The United States Export Control System
To assist evaluation of congressional and industry perceptions of
prior export policy and full understanding of the changes made by the
Amendments, a brief examination of export law as applied to computer
technology exports to China follows.
Export controls exist because of a belief that unrestricted private
sales to Communist countries may not be in the public interest. Propo-
nents of export controls believe that computer exporters will blindly seek
to maximize profit and thereby underestimate the security risks of their
own transactions. Thus, the 1979 Act authorizes the Commerce Depart-
ment to prohibit or restrict exports of goods or technology for reasons of
national security,78 foreign policy,79 or scarcity. 8 Hardware81 and
software are "dual-use" products-products with nonmilitary applica-
tions that could contribute to the military potential of hostile nations.8 2
As such, they are subject to national security export controls.8 3
In a typical export transaction, the party who proposes to export
computer technology from the United States to China must follow the
76. ITR/Tech Transfer, supra note 46, at 1375.
77. Civil Law, [1 Bus. Reg.] China Laws for Foreign Business (CCH Australia Ltd.)
19-150 (Sept. 21, 1987).
78. The 1979 Act permits national security export controls on dual-use products. 50
U.S.C. app. § 2404 (1979).
79. Id. § 2405. Foreign policy controls may be imposed, e.g., on nations that support
international terrorism or violate basic principles of human rights.
80. The 1979 Act permits controls on export of goods in short supply within the U.S. Id.
§ 2406.
81. Hardware includes analog and hybrid computers, digital computers, digital central
processing units, random access auxiliary storage, serial access auxiliary storage, terminals,
printers, communications peripherals, parts, microprocessor integrated circuits, printed circuit
boards, and cathode ray tubes.
82. E.g., electronic chips and integrated circuits can also be used in military weapons
systems.
83. For a discussion of export controls on hardware and software, see McKenzie, United
States Export Controls on Computer Hardware and Software Exports (1986) (unpublished
manuscript).
1987]
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
licensing procedures delineated by the Regulations. 4 Specific authoriza-
tion to export in the form of an individual validated export license is
required for the export of any controlled commodity or technical data to
any destination to which the controls apply." To obtain an individual
validated export license, an exporter must file a formal application for
each order for exports of computer products, components, peripherals,
or related equipment. In addition, an exporter must submit special docu-
mentation for either hardware 6 or software8 7 exports. Before the OEA
will grant a validated license, the proposed export must be reviewed and
approved by both the OEA and the Coordinating Committee for Multi-
lateral Export Controls (COCOM).
1. OEA Licensing Review
The licensing procedure involves a case-by-case review of proposed
exports. To assist the review, the OEA has set up several guidelines.
China belongs to Country Group V for purposes of national security ex-
port controls.8 8 Classification of a country in a particular group deter-
mines both the requirements for a validated license and the licensing
policy for proposed exports to that country. Export policy for China is
similar to that for most friendly, nonaligned nations, including Western
Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and non-Communist Asia.
The OEA maintains the Commodity Control List (CCL),89 which
identifies items subject to the Commerce Department's export controls.
The CCL provides that validated export licenses are required for the ex-
84. 15 C.F.R. §§ 368-399 (1987). For a general description of the Commerce Depart-
ment's export control system, see Gerwin, An Introduction to US. Export Control Laws, PRAC.
LAW., Apr. 1986, at 25.
85. 15 C.F.R. § 372.1 (1987).
86. The applicant must submit the following: (1) the computer's parameters and specifi-
cations; (2) documentation identifying all parties to the transaction, the proposed location and
end-use, and technical justification for the end-user's need for the equipment; (3) detailed in-
formation about software to be supplied for use with the computers; (4) assurances against
diversion of computers from the stated designation and end-use; and (5) the end-user's agree-
ment to visitation rights by representatives of the exporting firm to confirm that the equipment
has not been improperly diverted to unauthorized destination or use. Id. § 376.10.
87. An application for a proposed software export requires the following additional infor-
mation: (1) the name and a functional description of the software and the computer on which
it will operate; (2) identification of source or object code and supporting manuals, if included;
(3) a description of the scope of training of people receiving the software and the scope of
software maintenance and support (to the extent this information is available); (4) export his-
tory; and (5) the relationship of the program in the stated end-use of the hardware equipment.
Id. § 379.
88. Id. § 385.4(c). On November 23, 1983, the OEA published amendments to the Regu-
lations, which reclassified China to Group V. 48 Fed. Reg. 53,064-71 (1983).
89. 15 C.F.R. § 399.1 (1987).
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port to China of the following: machinery and equipment for the manu-
facture of electronic equipment, components, and materials; 90 electronic
component assemblies, integrated circuits, and other semiconductor de-
vices;91 electronic computers and related equipment, including instru-
ments and equipment that incorporate or embody digital computers and
microprocessors; 92 and recording equipment and related items, including
magnetic recording media. 93 The Advisory Notes in the CCL entries
identify commodities likely to be approved for export and contain useful
information on the OEA's policies and practices regarding the particular
goods.
The OEA divides commodities into three lists-green, yellow, and
red.94 Products on the green list represent minimal security risks. Green
list licensing generally is approved quickly, without interagency review,
based on whether there is a risk of diversion to unauthorized users or
potentially hostile destinations. 95 The DOD reviews some computers on
the green list to insure that the computers will not be used in a manner
contrary to strategic interests.96 The procedure generally is conducted in
fewer than ten days.97 The list includes semiconductor manufacturing
equipment, computerized instruments, virtually all eight-bit and sixteen-
bit microcomputers, and seventy-five to eighty percent of medium-scale
mainframe computers. 98
High-technology exports usually fall into the yellow and red catego-
ries. Both the OEA and the DOD review the application under the more
stringent standard of whether the commodities may make a significant
contribution to Chinese military potential.99 The yellow list contains
high-technology exports with potential to affect the national security of
the United States. The red list includes the most advanced technology
available to the United States, that is, items which could be used in devel-
opment of advanced military systems. The agencies usually deny permis-
sion to export red list items.
90. Id. Supp. 1, Group 3, 1355A.
91. Id. Supp. 1, Group 5 1564A.
92. Id. Supp. 1, Group 5, 1565A.
93. Id. Supp. 1, Group 5, 1572A.
94. Overman, Reauthorization of the Export Administration Act: Balancing Trade Policy
with National Security, 17 L. & POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 325, 356 (1985).
95. 15 C.F.R. § 385.4 (1987).
96. Ranagan, Liberalizing Controls on Exports to China, CHINA Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec.
1986, at 49, 52.
97. Id.
98. McKenzie, China and U.S. Trade: Recent Export Regulations, 18 INT'L LAW. 455,
457 n.10 (1984).
99. Id. at 456-57.
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2. COCOM Review
The licensing process does not end with OEA approval if the under-
lying technology exceeds green list thresholds. Once the exporter has the
tentative approval of the Commerce Department, COCOM must also re-
view the validated license application."° COCOM, an informal trade or-
ganization, reviews requests of member nations' 0 to export controlled
commodities to the Soviet bloc, China, and the other Communist nations
of Asia. The objective of the review is to establish a uniform export con-
trol program among member nations to protect security interests. 102 To
control exports to nations which it considers "hostile," COCOM estab-
lishes an embargo list, reviews individual exceptions to the list, and re-
views the list multilaterally. 10
II. THE OEA REGULATIONS: CURRENT TREATMENT
OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY EXPORTS
TO CHINA
The inclusion of China in Country Group V for purposes of regula-
tory policy appears to be little more than symbolic. Significant excep-
tions distinguish China from the non-Communist countries in the same
group. At the urging of the Commerce Department, COCOM has begun
to relax its controls on proposed exports of computer technology to
China. The OEA has responded by amending its Regulations.
A. Country Group V Treatment
The Commerce Department ostensibly includes China in Country
Group V-a group of friendly, nonaligned nations-as a reflection of of-
ficial United States policy. As a practical matter, however, exports of
computer products to China continue to receive particular scrutiny. The
Regulations treat such applications differently because the products have
100. 15 C.F.R. § 370.13(1) (1987). The United States and several allies organized COCOM
in 1949 to coordinate export control policies toward communist countries. See generally Aep-
pel, Evolution of Multilateral Export Controls: A Critical Study of the CoCom Regime, 9
FLETCHER F. 105 (1985). In general, goods whose Commodity Number entries are immedi-
ately followed by the letter "A" are subject to COCOM review. The Mutual Defense Assist-
ance Control Act of 1951 authorized United States participation in COCOM. Pub. L. No. 82-
213, 65 Stat. 644 (1951) (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 1611-1613d (1976)).
101. The United States participates in COCOM with Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany, France, Greece, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Nor-
way, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. 15 C.F.R. § 370.2 (1987).
102. McKenzie, supra note 83, at 37; Note, supra note 50, at 2020.
103. Note, supra note 50, at 1099.
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potential strategic application and their proposed destination is Commu-
nist China.
In the commodities area, exporters of computer hardware generally
have a variety of licensing options. This discussion will focus on the more
common distribution license and general license. Exporters to China are
usually limited to the individual validated license. For China-bound
shipments of software, which the Regulations refer to as "technical
data," the exporter must also acquire validated licenses. In addition, be-
cause exports of both hardware and software to China generally require
validated licenses, exporters must comply with extensive special docu-
mentation provisions.
1. Commodities Licensing
Producers of standardized products such as personal computers typ-
ically export in bulk. The OEA issues two types of export licenses that
are useful for such purposes-the distribution license and the general li-
cense. The Regulations, however, require a hardware exporter to apply
for individual validated licenses. A validated license, which must be
granted for each individual item to be shipped, is a much more restricted
option with a time consuming application process.
a. The Distribution License
A United States exporter who, for example, contracts with a Chi-
nese buyer to supply a large order of personal computers over a period of
several months would benefit from the distribution licensing procedure.
The distribution license permits over a period of one year exports of con-
trolled commodities to a specified destination, pursuant to an interna-
tional marketing plan. 1" Because it is a type of validated license, the
distribution license is issued in response to the exporter's application.
Although the procedure authorizes exports of commodities destined for
most other countries in Country Group V, commodities for export to
China are not eligible."1
b. The General License
General license GLV (General License Value) permits the export of
controlled commodities of limited dollar values. 106 While general and
104. 15 C.F.R. § 373.3 (1987).
105. Id.
106. Id. § 371.5. The value of the controlled commodity must not exceed the dollar limit
that the CCL specifies. The Regulations permit no more than one shipment per week and
prohibit splitting a single order to stay under the value limitations.
19871
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
validated licenses are identical in legal effect, the exporter's time and ef-
fort to acquire them varies considerably. A general license is a broad
authorization which permits specified exports without formal applica-
tion. An individual validated license, on the other hand, must be applied
for and approved by the OEA and, possibly, by the DOD and COCOM
as well. In furtherance of the United States' obligations to its COCOM
partners, the OEA restricts the use of the GLV license for exports of
items subject to COCOM consideration, including computer hardware
and software. The procedure is available for the export of computer tech-
nology to approved Group V consignees, but the OEA Regulations ex-
pressly exclude China. 0 7
2. Technical Data Licensing
The Regulations deem an export of technical data to have occurred
when such information is made available or released to nonresident for-
eign nationals by oral communications within the United States, by vis-
ual inspection of facilities and equipment in the United States, or by the
application abroad of technical information and experience learned in the
United States.108 Most technical data'0 9 can be exported to Group V
destinations by using general license GTDR (General Technical Data
Restricted), which does not require prior OEA approval or license docu-
ments." 0 Most exports of proprietary technical data,"' however, re-
quire individual approval." 2 The Regulations require validated licenses
for China-bound technical data describing products controlled for na-
tional security reasons." 3 The validated licensing requirement allows the
OEA to review individual applications for the export of technical data
107. Id. § 373.3(a)(1)(ii). However, the OEA developed formal guidelines which identify
the terms and conditions under which individual validated licenses can be obtained for bulk
exports to China of personal and small business computers. These informal guidelines were
codified in regulatory amendments issued on December 27, 1985. 50 Fed. Reg. 52,900, 52,908
(1985) (adding Advisory Note 20 to ECCN 1565A, 15 C.F.R. § 399.1, Supp. 1).
108. 15 C.F.R. § 379.1(b) (1987).
109. Software and other technical data is listed under ECCN 139 IA. Id. § 399.1, Supp. 1,
Group 3.
110. Id. § 379.4. The GTDR license may be used for technical data relating to many kinds
of general industrial equipment.
111. "Technical data" refers to "information of any kind that can be used ... in the design,
production, manufacture, utilization, or reconstruction of articles or materials." Id. § 379.1.
"Proprietary technical data" is technical data not in the public domain (ie., not freely avail-
able to the public or obtainable at nominal cost).
112. Id. § 379.4.
113. Id. § 379.4(i). See generally Daunt, US. Export-Import Regulations on Software,
COMPUTER LAW., May 1986, at 22; McKenzie, Recent Developments in Contracts on Software
Exports, COMPUTER LAW., May 1985, at 11.
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relating to hardware designs or embodied in software.1 14
The validated licensing requirement has important implications for
exporters of software sold separately from hardware. The Regulations
generally deem software to be technical data.115 Therefore, a validated
license is required to export software to China. The main exception is for
software that accompanies a commodity, such as a computer, previously
licensed for export and that is necessary for the operation of the licensed
commodity.1 6 Thus, at least in theory, exporters may acquire GTDR
general licenses for software that qualifies as operating 17 and mainte-
nance 18 technical data. 119 Preprogrammed system software120 and appli-
cations software1 21 to be exported with computers that already have
validated licenses are generally eligible for GTDR licensing. The ease of
use of general license GTDR is only theoretical, however, because the
Regulations require the application for an export license to ship com-
puters to China to include a detailed description of software supplied
with the computers.12
2
3. Documentation Requirements
The Regulations require the exporter to submit lengthy documenta-
tion. 1 23 While other exports to destinations in Country Group V are ex-
empt, computer technology exports to China are subject to strict
examination because of their potential strategic application. The Regula-
tions require a formidable array of detailed information. 24
114. 15 C.F.R. § 379.4 (1987).
115. Id. § 379.1.
116. Id. § 379.4.
117. Operating system software controls "(a) [t]he operation of a 'digital computer' or of
'related equipment', or (b) [t]he loading or execution of 'programs'." Id. § 379, Supp. 3.
118. Maintenance system software functions to "(a) [m]odify 'software' or its associated
documentation in order to correct faults, or for other updating purposes; or (b) '[m]aintain'
equipment." Id.
119. Id. § 379.4.
120. System software includes operating and maintenance software. Id. § 379, Supp. 3.
121. Application software is generally divided into two categories. Cross-industry applica-
tions software includes general purpose programs appropriate for many types of users (e.g.,
payroll or inventory control). Industry-specific applications software includes programs writ-
ten for a unique industry application (eg., airline scheduling or demand deposit accounting).
The Regulations define application software as " '[s]oftware' not falling within any of the defi-
nitions of the other categories of 'software'." Id. § 379, Supp. 3.
122. Id. § 376.10.
123. Id.
124. See supra notes 86 (documentation requirements for proposed hardware exports), 87
(documentation requirements for proposed software exports).
19871
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
B. Relaxation of COCOM Controls
The requirement of COCOM approval of validated license applica-
tions for the export of computer technology to China is based on interna-
tional agreement. The Commerce Department may not amend its
regulations without prior multilateral COCOM agreement. When
COCOM recently acted to ease controls, the Commerce Department re-
sponded swiftly to amend the Regulations.
1. Policy on Computer Exports
In December 1984 COCOM relaxed its controls on computer ex-
ports. 125 The Commerce Department issued new regulations on April
26, 1985,126 that reflected new COCOM policy. The regulations elimi-
nated validated license requirements for certain low-level computers with
processing data rates (PDRs) 127 of less than two Megabits per second
and total internal storage of 1.1 Megabits or less 128 and related peripher-
als. Although exports of computers and related equipment generally re-
quire validated licenses, 129 personal computers such as Apple II,
Commodore 64, and Radio Shack Model 100, which were no longer
state-of-the-art, were excepted.130 Computer-controlled telecommunica-
tions switching equipment was also affected. Validated licenses are no
longer required for otherwise nonstrategic electronic equipment with em-
bedded or incorporated microprocessors with PDRs of 28 Megabits per
second or less.13 1 Hard disks, which are necessary to store the extensive
125. McKenzie, supra note 113, at 12.
126. 49 Fed. Reg. 50,608-32 (1984). See generally McKenzie, Changes in Export Controls
on Computers and Software, COMPUTER LAW., Jan. 1985, at 28; McKenzie, supra note 113.
127. The export control status of an electronic computer is based on the operating speed of
the computer, measured by its processing data rate (PDR). The formula set out in Advisory
Note 16 to ECCN 1565A determines the PDR. 15 C.F.R. § 399.1, Supp. 1 (1987). The upper
limit for approval approximates a PDR of 1000, although other technical specifications, such
as peripherals, disk drives, and main memory capacity, are important factors. Ranagan, supra
note 96, at 50.
128. 15 C.F.R. § 399.1, Supp. 1 (1987).
129. Exporters of computers and related equipment classified under ECCN 1565A must
obtain validated licenses. The category includes analog computers and related equipment, dig-
ital computers which are designed to limit electromagnetic radiation or those which can be
modified for military use. Id. § 399.1, Supp. 1.
130. Higher level machines such as Apple's MacIntosh and the IBM PC-AT remain sub-
ject to use restrictions. Revised CCL on Computers Tightens Some Items, Loosens Personal
Computer Controls, 2 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 4, 4 (Jan. 2, 1985).
131. The regulation does not exempt digital computers embedded or incorporated in other
systems except for low-level digital computers embedded in systems that have low total PDRs.
15 C.F.R. § 399.1, Supp. 1 (1987).
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Chinese character set, still require export approval. 132
2. Policy on Exports to China
Prior to December 1985, critics charged that COCOM's identical
treatment of exports bound for China and the Soviet Union was inconsis-
tent with the United States policy of promoting high-technology trade
with China. In keeping with its efforts to liberalize export controls on
goods destined for China, the Commerce Department set up the China
Team Center, a self-contained unit of licensing officers, program officers,
and licensing support personnel, on July 16, 1985.133 Because most
China cases are now reviewed in a single location, licensing consideration
has been accelerated considerably.
COCOM partners and the Commerce Department agreed to im-
prove the processing of license applications for some high technology ex-
ports to China. 134 Amendments to the Regulations issued in the form of
a final rule on December 27, 1985.135 The final rule made three substan-
tial changes to previous export policy.
a. Commodity Control List
The OEA's final rule raised the technical thresholds for proposed
exports that require COCOM review. The amendments established or
revised the Advisory Notes regarding the computer equipment and tech-
nical data categories of the CCL. 136 The final rule enlarged the scope of
the license. Previously, to re-export computer technology which had
been licensed for export and shipped to a COCOM country, an exporter
had to receive additional COCOM approval. Commodities and technical
data within the new limits may now be re-exported to China from
COCOM countries under licenses issued by those countries 137 without
COCOM scrutiny.
The change also raised the technical levels for COCOM review:
132. Id.
133. Progress on COCOM Controls for China Reported by Archey in Hill Testimony, 2 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1295, 1295 (Oct. 16, 1985) [hereinafter ITR/Progress on COCOM
Controls].
134. Id.
135. 50 Fed. Reg. 52,900-08 (1985).
136. Id. The CCL lists goods subject to OEA export controls. 15 C.F.R. § 399.1, Supp. 1
(1987). The computer software controls are set out separately. Id. § 379, Supp. 3.
137. Re-export from a COCOM country to China requires no separate authorization if the
exporter meets the following conditions: (1) the software must meet the requirements of 15
C.F.R. § 379, Supp. 3; and (2) the COCOM country must approve the license. Id. § 379.8.
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products within the scope of the Advisory Notes 138 may be licensed for
export to China without COCOM review and approval. The COCOM
agreement and subsequent CCL amendments, however, changed very lit-
tle in the computer technology area. For example, COCOM decided not
to review license applications for machines with a PDR of 155 or less,
provided the proposed export met all other specifications. 139 That level is
identical to the United States threshold in effect since 1983. Moreover,
COCOM liberalization of other categories not previously liberalized in
the Regulations is expected to have little effect on the application pro-
cess. One senior DOD official speculated that processing would be expe-
dited for only an additional two or three percent of all license
applications to China.' 40
b. Service Supply Procedures
The final rule also raised the maximum value of parts that may be
shipped to China under the Service Supply Procedure.14 A service sup-
ply license authorizes exports of spare parts for goods previously ex-
ported. As noted above, provision of spare parts and service is a key
issue for computer exporters. 142 Parts for computers and computer-re-
lated products may be exported to China if their value does not exceed
$50,000, they do not upgrade the performance of the legally exported
equipment being serviced, and all controlled parts being replaced are re-
turned to a COCOM country for disposal.
143
c. Documentation Requirements
Finally, the final rule added a new section to the documentation re-
quirements of the Regulations. The license application to export or re-
export computer-related goods valued at more than $5000 must be ac-
companied by a "PRC End-Use Certificate."'" Previously, the OEA rec-
ognized end-use certificates from any importing organization. The new
regulations require the Chinese importer to provide the United States
exporter with a copy of the certificate issued by the Ministry of Foreign
Economic Relations and Trade's (MOFERT) Technology Import and
Export Department in Beijing. MOFERT certifies that the goods are for
138. For a discussion of products within the scope of the Advisory Notes, see text accom-
panying notes 89-99.
139. Ranagan, New COCOM Policy, CHINA Bus. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1986, at 53.
140. Id.
141. 15 C.F.R. § 373.7 (1987). See also McKenzie, supra note 98, at 456.
142. See supra text accompanying note 42.
143. 15 C.F.R. § 373.7 (1987).
144. Id. § 375.6.
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use in China and will not be re-exported to a third country. Upon receipt
of an end-use certificate with a license application, the OEA can rapidly
issue a license that previously required months of interagency and multi-
lateral review. 1
45
Under the new regulations, the Commerce Department predicts a
substantial decrease in overall licensing time because of two factors: a
decrease in the number of applications that require COCOM review and
a reduction in the amount of time required for review of those applica-
tions that demand it.146 The first factor generally does not apply to a
great number of computer-related exports. The Commerce Department
predicts that applications falling within the new technical specifications
for China should be processed within thirty days. 147 Statistics appear to
indicate some progress in decreasing processing time. By the end of fiscal
1985, processing times in the OEA for China applications had already
been cut to fiscal 1983 levels, although the caseload had increased by 162
percent in the aggregate.148
I. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AMENDMENTS
Scepticism abounds over the implementation of the Amendments.
Export advocates feel that the Carter or Reagan administrations did not
entirely implement prior legislative provisions. Moreover, they believe
that the Amendments may not be carried out as proposed.
A. Current Industry Response
Since Congress approved the Amendments in June 1985, the
number of licensing applications for exports to China has increased.149
While initial industry response may be an insufficient basis for specula-
tion on the long-term effect of the Amendments, relaxed controls should
allow American producers of computer technology to acquire a good
share of the $4 billion Chinese market for computers and communica-
145. U.S.-COCOM Agreement Reached on Improving Processing of Exports License Appli-
cations, 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 11, 11 (Jan. 1, 1986) [hereinafter ITR/US-COCOM
Agreement].
146. ITR/Tech Transfer, supra note 46, at 1374.
147. ITR/US-COCOM Agreement, supra note 145, at 11.
148. ITRIProgress on COCOM Controls, supra note 133, at 1296. The time period for the
issuance or denial of licenses for low- and high-technology goods being exported to non-
COCOM countries is cut by a third under the Export Administration Amendments Act of
1985, 50 U.S.C. § 2409(h) (Supp. III 1985).
149. Ranagan, supra note 139, at 53.
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tions.'5 ° Industry representatives, however, expect the Administration to
adhere to a strict policy on computer technology exports relative to con-
trols on other exports.I51 Meanwhile, business pressure to strengthen the
nation's trading position continues to mount.152 While computer technol-
ogy firms support national security interests, they feel the current system
of export controls, even as amended, fails to address specific concerns
about exports to China. 53
B. Chinese Perspective
A top official of the Technology Import and Export Department of
the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade has asserted that
the Chinese Government is looking to the United States for technology
and equipment. 54 Although the Chinese are eager to import computer
technology, they dismiss the current United States policy amendment as
"only a slight relaxation"' 55 and urge the Commerce Department to ease
controls further. Two themes recur: Chinese officials object to the con-
tinued imposition of national security controls and criticize COCOM
controls and the pace of the review process.' 5 6 Theoretically, Chinese
objections could be prompted solely by self-interest. Removal of legal
barriers to the importation of United States computer technology would
best serve China's plans for industrialization. In fact, the Chinese are
forced to circumvent United States controls to supply their own needs.
There is evidence that the Chinese are continuing to secure United States
and COCOM controlled technology, which might be approved under ex-
isting controls, without licenses from other sources. In one case, a re-
ported 7000 PC-XTs were smuggled into China without COCOM
approval.'5 7 Such occurrences suggest that the Chinese are likely to de-
mand further relaxation of controls.
150. U.S. Telecommunications Exhibitions for 1986 in Japan and China are Endorsed by
Commerce, 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 24, 24 (Jan. 1, 1986).
151. Ericson, supra note 51, at 2A, cols. 5-6.
152. N.Y. Times, June 18, 1986, at D1, col. 6; id., Feb. 10, 1987, at A41, col. 1.
153. Id., Feb. 10, 1987, at A41, col. 1.
154. Chinese Official Says Technology Trade Could Significantly Grow If U.S. Lifts Re-
straints, 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1387, 1387 (Nov. 19, 1986) (hereinafter ITR/Technology
Trade Growth).
155. J. Com. & Com., Apr. 23, 1985, at 2A, col. 6.
156. ITRITechnology Trade Growth, supra note 153, at 1387.
157. King, supra note 62, at 61. Other unlicensed imports of controlled items have been
reported. See, e.g., Chinese Interest in Economic Ties With U.S. Cited By Congressional Dele-
gation in Report, 3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1436, 1437 (Nov. 26, 1986).
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C. Congressional Assessment
The Amendments fall short of the larger goal of export control pol-
icy reform.15 8 Congress' original goal was "[t]o unleash the en-
trepreneurial ability of our high-tech community with a minimum of
government interference--consistent, of course, with national security
requirements."15 9 That goal quickly became subject to complex congres-
sional negotiation. Although the Administration continues to work to
simplify licensing, many members of Congress are sceptical that the
Amendments will be fully implemented.16° In the words of House For-
eign Affairs Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade
Chairman Don Bonker, "[W]e would be fooling ourselves if we thought
for a moment that what we've put into this new law ... is going to be
fully implemented, or at least implemented as Congress intended."'1
61
D. Administrative Licensing and Enforcement Policy
Several executive branch agencies with competing objectives are re-
sponsible for the licensing of exports and the enforcement of controls.
1 62
Conflicts arise between the Commerce Department and the DOD in the
licensing process, and between the Commerce Department and the
Treasury Department's Customs Service in enforcement.1 63 When trade
legislation leaves Congress, those competing agencies further shape ex-
port control policy..
Historically, the Commerce Department has sought to liberalize ex-
port controls to China. 64 The DOD, on the other hand, has attempted
158. 131 CONG. REC., supra note 13, at H5060 (statement of Rep. Bonker).
159. Id. at H5062 (statement of Rep. Mica).
160. Id. at H5061 (statement of Rep. Roth); id. at H5060 (statement of Rep. Bonker); id. at
S8922 (statement of Sen. Heinz); id. at S8923 (statement of Sen. Garn); id. at S8927 (statement
of Sen. Byrd).
161. Banker Outlines Plans Following EAA Bill, Suggests Court Suit Over DOD Review
Move, 2 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 952, 952 (July 24,1985) [hereinafter ITR/Bonker Plans].
162. The agencies involved are the Commerce, State, and Treasury Departments, the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency, the National Security Council, and the Office of Management and
Budget. Id. Interagency review occurs when the export in question is sensitive enough to
trigger review by a government agency other than the Commerce Department (typically, the
DOD). Overman, supra note 94 at 333-34.
163. Overman, supra note 162 at 12. The Customs Service may search and seize goods at
borders and, with permission of the foreign government, may search and seize goods abroad.
Export Administration Amendments Act of 1985, 50 U.S.C. § 2411 (Supp. III 1985). The
Commerce Department may search and seize goods within the United States and, with Cus-
toms Service concurrence, at ports of entry or export. Both agencies may arrest without war-
rants where there is probable cause to believe export control laws have been violated. Id.
164. Wash. Post, Jan. 10, 1984, at D9, col. 5.
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to maintain strict controls on exports to all Communist countries. 65 For
example, the DOD would like to prohibit overseas sales of some home
computers.1 66 The results of such tensions are interagency disputes
within the Administration, a proliferation of directives, regulations, pol-
icy statements, and duplicative investigation efforts. 167 Further compro-
mise in export control policy inevitably ensues when competing agencies
search for mutually acceptable solutions. Even if the Commerce Depart-
ment obeys the letter and spirit of the legislation, thereby alleviating spe-
cific interagency concerns, the result may not be sufficient to meet the
computer technology industry's economic and political needs.
IV. ARGUMENT AND ANALYSIS
The Amendments and the recent changes in the Regulations repre-
sent short-term solutions to long-term declines in the computer indus-
try's ability to compete internationally. The seriousness of the problems
Congress addressed in the Amendments is clear. There is substantial evi-
dence of declining American competitiveness in the computer indus-
try. 168  In addition, exports destined for China remain subject to
extensive restrictions inconsistent with the objectives of Congress. While
Congress' policy for controlling validated licensing has changed radi-
cally, the Administration maintains extensive control. Congress did not
fully achieve its goals through the Amendments, and it is doubtful that
its response was the most effective means of solving these problems.
The current export control system has serious implications for the
United States computer industry. While the Amendments improved the
previous system, the Regulations perpetuate inherent problems. Frus-
trated by uncertainties and licensing delays, Chinese customers are turn-
ing to other suppliers.
A. Uncertainty
The Amendments are a haphazard compromise between the need to
keep United States exporters internationally competitive and the need to
protect United States national security interests vis-A-vis China. The ef-
fect of the Amendments depends upon their implementation through
regulations adopted by the Administration and on Congress' willingness
and ability continuously to oversee the Commerce Department's regula-
165. Id.
166. King, supra note 62, at 61.
167. ITRIBonker Plans, supra note 161, at 952.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 18-37.
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tory actions. Congress and the Administration need to effect a workable
compromise between policy and licensing and enforcement administra-
tion. Furthermore, they must resolve the COCOM review problem.
1. Export Control Policy
The ambiguity of the Amendments' language is reflected in the in-
ability of the Administration to develop clear and adequate criteria to
guide the OEA in making day-to-day decisions. Although the changes
have relaxed previous controls, they do not reflect a serious departure in
policy.' 6 9 Current policy does not make the tradeoff between economic
benefits, political effects, and national security risks in any structured
way.170 For example, a slight security risk justifies restriction, even if
potential sales are large. Congress and the Administration need to re-
solve the conflict between promoting exports of computer technology
and tightening export controls.
The export control system needs a clear, well-founded rationale for
restricting some goods and allowing others. The conference report
171
and floor statements do not provide guidance. 172 The report analyzes
few issues the conference resolved and provides no interpretation of the
Amendments' provisions.
The effect of national security controls on exports requires re-evalu-
ation. The principal risk involved in increasing technology exports is the
possible use of technology in ways posing security threats for the United
States if relations with China were to deteriorate. The rationale inherent
in the export licensing mechanism is that the export of high-technology
products to China will enhance the military potential of the Soviet Union
or China. Pentagon officials contend that relaxation of controls would
allow the Soviet Union to acquire technology that could be used for mili-
tary purposes.' 73 The DOD's 1986 report to Congress on its Technology
Security Program claimed that export controls saved the United States
169. Commentators have suggested that "waging economic warfare" against the Soviet
Union and Eastern bloc countries is the Administration's real purpose behind controls on
dual-use technology. ITR/Bonker Plans, supra note 161, at 952.
170. An empirical study described the tradeoff as follows: If economic and political bene-
fits exceed any costs to military enhancement, the utility of high-technology trade will be en-
hanced; conversely, trade restrictions will reduce utility if economic and political losses are
greater than national security enhancement. Kamerschen & Robinson, An Analysis of the Ex-
port Licensing Mechanism and Its Effect Upon the Competitiveness of U.S. High Technology
Exports, 17 AKRON Bus. & ECON. REV. 12, 15 (1986).
171. 131 CONG. REC., supra note 13, at S8921-27.
172. Harris & Bialos, supra note 9, at 20 n.1.
173. San Jose Mercury News, Feb. 1, 1987, at 20A, cols. 3-4.
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and its allies up to $13.2 billion in defense spending in recent years. 174
The reasoning underlying the DOD's report is faulty. The report
based its finding on a comparison of current realities with two supposi-
tions: (1) less effective controls than those now in force and (2) Soviet
acquisition of a number of significant technologies. 175 A government
study points out the irony of the first supposition. Approval of a sale to
the Soviet Union could take months, even if the proposed export were a
microprocessor costing fifteen dollars that a Soviet embassy official in
Washington could buy from the local Radio Shack. 176 In addition, the
export of United States computer technology to China would probably
never result in the occurrence of the second supposition. China is not a
member of the Soviet bloc, nor is China committed to the same military
aims as the Soviets. The DOD's rationale also assumes that exports of
computer technology to China will adversely affect the United States'
own military potential. The effect of exports of computer technology on
United States military potential is probably negligible, given the small
volume of computer technology exports in relation to the total produced
and the unlikelihood that United States defense capability is dependent
for technological enhancement on computer technology such as is ex-
ported to China. The National Academy of Sciences questioned the
DOD estimates. "Despite an intensive acquisition effort," the
Acadamy's draft report stated, "the Soviets in general have not suc-
ceeded in matching the West's technology edge.... It is unlikely that an
influx of western technology will enable the Soviet Union to substantially
reduce the current gap-as long as the West continues its own pace of
innovation."' 177
Proponents of strict controls also argue that, with relaxed controls,
China would apply computer technology imported from the United
States to military ends. Such reasoning relies on several inaccurate as-
sumptions. First, it assumes that exports of computer technology to
China's civilian sector may easily be transferred to the military sector.
Ease of transfer would depend on whether the rigid organization of
China's centrally planned economy could be bypassed to reallocate com-
puter resources. The Five-Year Plan in force provides specific guidelines
for proposed government spending. Chinese officials are not likely to di-
174. Administration Controls Saved U.S., Allies Up To $3 Billion in Defense, Pentagon Says,
3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1513, 1513 (Dec. 17, 1986).
175. Id.
176. STAFF OF JOINT ECON. COMM., 99TH CONG., lsT SEss., AMERICAN EXPORTS: WHY
HAVE THEY LAGGED? 15 (Comm. Print 1985).
177. Wash. Post, supra note 43, at A16, col. 4.
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vert computer technology needed for industrial development to the mili-
tary sector and thereby jeopardize China's efforts to decentralize.
Second, the rationale assumes that the export control system pro-
vides an effective measure of extraterritorial control. Proponents of con-
trols contend that, through the licensing requirements, the
Administration can continue to control the end use and potential reex-
port of the technology once it arrives at its Chinese destination. It is not
clear, however, that United States authorities or companies can prevent
the unauthorized use of computer technology, particularly within
China's high priority strategic weapons programs. Short of halting com-
puter technology exports completely, which would contravene current
policy toward China, the system offers no guarantees of control.
Third, there is an assumption that China, a developing country, has
the means to reproduce sophisticated computer technology. While
China continues to upgrade its manufacturing technology and know-
how, there is no evidence that China could transfer the technology it
currently imports into strategic form. In addition, as part of its policy to
encourage high technology imports, China has instituted enforceable
proprietary rights protections.17
8
Even if one accepts the notion that trade with China in computer
technology may enhance the military potential of an adversary, the relax-
ation of controls would not result ipso facto in a dangerous strategic situ-
ation. Increased trade simultaneously enhances political leverage.
179
Commentators feel that the United States, by broadening its commercial
dealings with China, can contribute to the development of a modem Chi-
nese economy that is dependent on a stable international order.' The
rationale is as follows: Trade promotes contracts, leading to more effec-
tive communication; trade provides mutually beneficial interaction, with
interlocking vested interests; and trade fosters convergence of economic
systems.' 8 ' Although this reasoning disregards the divergent political
and economic considerations of communistic China and the capitalistic
United States, it is unlikely that trade reduces political rapport. In fact,
past technology transfers have played an important part in the United
States' growing commercial and political relationship with China." 2
178. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.
179. Kamerschen & Robinson, supra note 170, at 15.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. U.S. Energy Technology Transfer Could Aid Both Countries, According to OTA Study,
2 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1153, 1153 (Sept. 18, 1985).
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2. Licensing and Enforcement Administration
The licensing and enforcement mechanism must be restructured to
provide more certainty. In particular, the roles of competing agencies
require clarification. Congress deferred consideration in the Amend-
ments of the roles of the DOD and the Customs Service in administering
export controls. 183 As matters stand, the exporter of computer technol-
ogy is at an initial disadvantage. The OEA theoretically has a strong
incentive to withhold validated licenses in close cases. If the OEA grants
the license for a controversial export, those who feel controls are too lax
may be critical. Alternatively, the DOD may cancel the OEA's approval
if the DOD decides to deny the license. If the OEA denies the license, it
angers only the applicant, who may then take his chances with the time
consuming appeals process. Numerous variations of this scenario are
possible with the substitution of other agencies involved in the licensing
process.
3. COCOM Review
The United States must take further measures to eliminate the ob-
stacle presented by COCOM's China policy in order to accomplish the
ultimate goals of the Amendments. Although many problems have been
resolved by recent negotiations,184 several factors in the COCOM review
process may give rise to future trade impediments. First, COCOM mem-
bers may have divergent interests. Some COCOM members are competi-
tors of the United States in the microcomputer market.' 85 Second,
members may abuse the review process for commercial gain.186 A Com-
merce Department official noted that some of the newly liberalized CCL
categories reflect the commercial interests of other members. 187 Third,
without continuous review, COCOM guidelines may become technologi-
cally outdated.' In Fall 1985, however, COCOM members agreed to
meet every six months to determine whether application decisions during
the interim justify further liberalization of COCOM guidelines.18 9
The regulatory changes COCOM announced in December 1985 ap-
pear to be a genuine liberalization. Data for the first half of 1986 indicate
that United States applications for China-bound exports still constitute
183. 131 CONG. REC., supra note 13, at S8922-23 (statement of Sen. Garn).
184. See supra text accompanying notes 125-48.
185. King, supra note 62, at 59; Note, supra note 50, at 2020.
186. Simon, supra note 57, at 266; Note, supra note 50, at 2020.
187. Ranagan, supra note 139, at 53.
188. Note, supra note 50, at 2020.
189. Ranagan, supra note 139, at 53.
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about ninety-three percent of COCOM's United States caseload.1 90 It
does not necessarily follow, however, that COCOM's regulatory changes
do not address the volume of applications. Several factors distort the
figures. While the number of applications for China-bound exports re-
mains high, the number of applications for Eastern Europe has
dropped.191 Thus, the China applications appear to be a larger share of
the total. In addition, the figures do not reflect the complete impact of
the December 1985 changes, which were not implemented until February
1986.192 The figures do not reflect processing time considerations, either.
Industry representatives have noted a dramatic reduction in processing
time of most green list cases. 193
B. Delays
American businesses should benefit from the changes in the licens-
ing procedure.' 94 The Amendments eliminate about forty percent of the
workload, which will "enable Commerce's licensing officers to scrutinize
more effectively high technology trade flows and destinations."1 95 Com-
puter technology exporters, however, still complain about delays that re-
sult from the control system. Industry representatives report that
approval of some green list cases takes up to sixty days, even since the
December 1985 COCOM revisions.1 96
Sales of computer technology to China will never move as quickly as
sales to Group V nations because of national security controls. The com-
parative delay presents a major problem for the industry because of the
type of computer technology that is being imported by Chinese buyers.
Exporters could expect a relatively better performance if the United
States had a comparative advantage related to technology rather than to
price competition. For example, buyers might be indifferent to such a
long waiting period if the United States were the only available source for
the particular computer technology they wanted. The Chinese might
likewise be indifferent to delay if the computers ordered included a
greater number of customer-specified, custom-designed qualities. If a
United States producer offered the most technologically advanced equip-
ment which the Chinese required, delay might be acceptable. For the
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. See Export Administration Amendments Act of 1985, 50 U.S.C. § 2409 (Supp. III
1985).
195. 131 CONG. REC., supra note 13, at H5060 (statement of Rep. Roth).
196. Ranagan, supra note 139, at 53.
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most part, however, China imports standardized personal and small busi-
ness computers.197 Delay dissuades Chinese buyers from purchasing
United States computer technology. Trade figures reflect that result. A
considerable portion of the United States loss in export orders is attribu-
table to time delays incurred within the validated licensing process.
198
Trade theory suggests that countries will tend to export those com-
modities in which they enjoy a comparative advantage. 99 As long as
foreign sources can provide China with similar technology more quickly,
the United States will be at a competitive disadvantage. To exacerbate
the problem, licensing delays are more detrimental to the computer in-
dustry than to any other industry.2" Small and medium-sized producers
of personal computers, integrated circuits, and components spend a dis-
proportionate amount of time and resources on licensing procedures.20'
Delays are most frustrating to companies that are new to exporting or
are trying to penetrate a newer market such as China. The component
nature of much computer technology causes foreign customers to elimi-
nate United States parts and components, thus avoiding delays due to
export controls.20 2
C. Foreign Availability
The delay and uncertainty associated with obtaining approvals force
many foreign customers to choose a non-United States supplier.
Although both the United States and COCOM unconditionally approve
the great majority of China applications,20 3 the applications are for ex-
ports to buyers willing to weather the uncertainties and delays of the
approval process. The Chinese feel that the controls on the export of
technology frustrate China's modernization, causing them to turn to
other foreign companies to supply what the United States restricts. 2°4
In passing the Amendments, Congress believed it had addressed the
issue of foreign availability so that United States exporters would not be
denied market access when other countries did not enforce strict national
197. J. Com. & Com., supra note 155, at 2A, col. 6.
198. Schatz, supra note 39, at 69.
199. Kamerschen & Robinson, supra note 170, at 17.
200. Industry Groups Call for Changes in Gold Card Licensing Proposal in Comments Filed,
3 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1102, 1102 (1986).
201. Id.
202. Ericson, supra note 51, at 2A, col. 5.
203. Ninety-five percent of China applications are approved. Wolfowitz, INTER-
VIEW.U.S.-China Relations, 39 J. INT'L AFFAIRS 33, 37 (1986).
204. Xu, China's Economic Reform and Sino-US. Relations, 39 J. INT'L AFFAIRS 27, 29
(1986).
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security controls.20 5 The National Academy of Sciences study suggests
otherwise. The study concluded that the benefit to United States na-
tional security from strict export controls "is feasible only in the shrink-
ing number of cases in which the United States is the only country
possessing the technology."20 6 United States export controls effectively
have prevented Chinese acquisition of certain advanced military technol-
ogy. Export controls have not prevented China, however, from receiving
the type of standardized technology it wants from other countries. Ac-
cording to the study, export controls provided "clear incentives" against
buying United States products if other countries could supply compara-
ble products.20 7 Although the Chinese prefer American products, they
have met and discussed transactions with most of the major European
and Japanese firms in the computer field.208
China is not the only party hampered by export controls. Controls
also hamper any United States company attempting to make a sale. The
United States' stringent controls effectively aid foreign competitors of
American computer companies. The effect of stringent controls is partic-
ularly ironic at a time when the United States is fighting to stave off
declines in the computer technology trade balance through efforts to en-
courage exports and increase trade.
D. Long-Term Implications for the United States Computer Industry
Export controls have immediate effects on the computer industry's
ability to compete. They will also have a significant impact on the future
of the United States computer industry. The industry reports significant
declines in its overseas market shares after Congress imposes national
security controls.20 9 Decreased revenues and diminished world market
shares can seriously affect long-term competitiveness by undermining the
computer industry's effort to maintain a "technology gap." In effect, the
overseas buyer finances the producer's research and development, al-
lowing the producer to maintain technical leadership that generates new
products for more sales. A producer suffering from dwindling market
share and revenues might not be able to fund sufficient research and de-
velopment to maintain its innovative edge over foreign competitors.
When the ability to produce innovative technology and introduce it
205. 131 CONG. REc., supra note 13, at H5060 (statement of Rep. Bonker).
206. Wash. Post, supra note 43, at Al, col. 6.
207. Id. at A16, col. 2.
208. Simon, supra note 57, at 255-56; Huan, supra note 56.
209. See, e.g., ITR/Nat'l Trade Pol'y, supra note 52 (foreign sales of semiconductor equip-
ment to China). See also supra text accompanying notes 43-45.
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quickly into the market is crucial, the export control system places the
industry at a competitive disadvantage.
An additional long-term consequence will result if delay and uncer-
tainty continue to cause Chinese customers to seek alternate suppliers.
The computer technology trade surplus will continue to decline, threat-
ening the leadership of the United States in the software industry.
Software sales often are included in the sale of equipment or are required
for compatibility reasons. Hardware and software are so interdependent
that any market barrier to United States equipment suppliers also has a
negative effect on the United States software industry. Growing competi-
tion from foreign hardware manufacturers, many of whom also supply
software, may result in lost opportunities for United States software pro-
ducers. As more foreign software firms emerge as alternate sources for
separately packaged software, export restrictions on software could fur-
ther diminish the United States market share.
V. THE AMENDMENTS AS PRECEDENT FOR EXPORT
CONTROL REFORM
Recent changes in export law reflect a growing consensus in Wash-
ington that laws should be relaxed to allow the computer industry to
better compete in the international marketplace. Congress has altered
the control system significantly in the last few years by easing its restric-
tions on exports to China and by modifying its regulation of computer
hardware and software. More changes can be expected. Ironically, the
stated goal of the Amendments does not correspond with their actual
effect. Legislative efforts have been emasculated by China's explosive
technological growth. The exportation of American computer technol-
ogy to China could suffer without further liberalization.
Will further liberalization of export control significantly improve the
computer industry's access to foreign markets? The National Academy
of Sciences concluded in its recent study that export controls are not a
leading cause of the recent decline in the high-technology trade bal-
ance. 210 Part of the reason is macroeconomic; the strength of the dollar
and the rise in domestic demand after the 1981-1982 recession are cited
as factors.211 Other influences that contribute to the dreary outlook in-
clude foreign trade practices, offset agreements in military sales overseas,
and United States firms' greater use of foreign subsidiaries or independ-
210. Wash. Post, supra note 43, at A16, col. 2.
211. W. FINAN, P. QUICK & K. SANDBERG, THE U.S. TRADE POSITION IN HIGH TECH-
NOLOGY: 1980-1986, J. Doc. No. 842, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1986).
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ent contractors.212 The problem vis-A-vis Japan may also stem from a
loss of comparative technological strength.213
While the Academy does not consider export controls a leading
cause of recent declines in the trade balance, the study does state that
export controls "may tend to exacerbate the U.S. trade deficit by contrib-
uting to an environment that discourages export activities by U.S.
firms." '2 14 The competitive well-being of the United States computer
technology industry depends on its ability to sell in foreign markets.2 15
National security export controls have placed United States producers at
a disadvantage.
Current and historical United States administrative policy has
passed over the economic needs of the computer industry in favor of na-
tional security concerns. Policy has permitted neither statutory adapta-
tion nor change in the structure of the governing administrative agency.
A wait and see policy is not appropriate for computer technology ex-
ports, because it will not satisfy the critical need for speedy processing.
What is needed is an acceptable way to accommodate legitimate eco-
nomic policies in the export control system while maintaining legitimate
national security restrictions. Recent changes represent an important
step in expediting current licensing procedures, but Congress can shape
export administration to achieve its goals more effectively. Export con-
trols are a nonmarket factor that seriously affect the computer technol-
ogy industry to the disadvantage of United States producers. Export
administration represents an appropriate area in which the United States
Government can take affirmative action to insure free and open
competition.
The competitive situation of the United States computer industry
calls for a revision of export controls to accomplish two objectives. A
revision should enable the Administration to handle a high volume of
routine transactions in a manner that would permit closer scrutiny and
enforcement of the relatively few, but more stategically dangerous, trans-
actions. At the same time, a revision should free the computer industry
from much of the delay and inconvenience of current procedures. Three
specific amendments are suggested.
First, a revision should define adequately the relative importance of
competing interagency objectives. Simultaneously, the definition should
be flexible enough to produce timely, rational results in keeping with in-
212. Id. at 3-4.
213. Id. at 4-5.
214. Wash. Post, supra note 43, at A16, col. 2.
215. Id.
1987]
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
ternational market realities. The Administration needs a realistic stan-
dard that it can refer to before deciding to impose controls. Currently,
the Administration has discretion to scrutinize applications even for
computer technology that falls within the CCL's green list. A new stan-
dard should mandate decontrol of technology that offers no serious
threat to United States security. The new standard also should allow the
Administration to strengthen the enforcement of controls on technology
that could harm United States security.
The processing of license applications in the order in which they are
received severely handicaps the computer industry. A second revision
should provide a special export licensing mechanism that will reduce
time delays for standardized computer products, which face greater com-
petition from overseas suppliers. The system should distinguish product
groups such as personal computers and peripherals that are most affected
by delays. For such products, foreign availability of comparable goods
and technology should be the controlling criterion. For technology that
is not critical for national security reasons, the OEA should grant an
export license if there is an available alternate source.
Third, a revision should make the application process responsive to
the requested destination. The revision could accomplish this by insti-
tuting expedited licensing consideration for exports to new and critical
markets like China. Rather than have the application pass through the
entire processing mechanism, the Commerce Department should give
priority routings to applications for exports to designated countries.
Any changes in United States export administration must coordi-
nate with COCOM policy. Although the 1985 revisions appear to render
review of applications for China-bound computer technology less bur-
densome, the United States Government should continue to seek mutual
agreement and consistent application of national security controls by
COCOM members. When the rate of technological progress has out-
dated COCOM guidelines, the Commerce Department should urge re-
view and update of technological levels. The United States should
promote a policy of fair competitive standing among the COCOM mem-
bers and strong multilateral controls over products that can contribute to
Soviet military potential.
CONCLUSION
Expedited licensing procedures and improved technological levels
will affect the computer trade balance in the future, but by themselves
will not translate into competitive advantage. The recent changes
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brought about by the Amendments offer no real remedy for America's
declining computer trade surplus. The United States computer industry
cannot take competitive advantage of the Chinese market unless Con-
gress and the Administration act to make United States export policy
more effective. The problem requires consideration of the computer
technology industry's special characteristics and needs, and a concomi-
tant change in export control administration.

